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ESTATE OF

[Sac. No. 5356.

Knw.

In Bank.

[19 C. (2d)

Feb. 3, 1942.]

Estate of FRANK J. KING, Deceased. FRANK A. KING,
Executor, etc., et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPHINE KING,
Executrix, .etc., Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Powers,
etc.-Decedent's Business-Continuillg.-A provision in a will
authorizing an executor to retain cattle and horses for one year
and directillg a sale when advantageous is authority for carry""
ing on the business until a sale call be made to advantage. Such
authorization is not affected hy the election of the widow to
inherit her share under the rules of succession.

[2] Id.-Executors and Administrators-Powers, etc.-Rights as
to Property-Care-Presumption.-It is the duty of an executor, with or without an order of court, to take charge of the
property of an estate and to preserve it in as good cOll'lition as
is reasonably possible pendil,g administration., In estate proceedings involving a cattle enterprise which an executor was
empowered to conduct, it must be presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary that the stock was properly cared for,
that the expense of doing so was necessarily incurred, and that
the horses and cattle were sold as promptly as was for the best
interest of the estate.
[3] Id.-Executors and Administrators - Compensation - Extra
Compensation - Carrying on Business.-An executor who is
authorized by the will to carry on the business of the deceased
person and who conducts such business at a profit is properly
allowed extra compensation therefor. The amount thereof rests
in the discretion of the trial court, and its allowance will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears to be excessive.

[4] Id. _ Executors and Administrators - Compensation - Allow-

ance-Appeal.-The right of appeal from an order allowing an
executrix extra compensation is waived by failure to give
notice of appeal within 60 days from the time of the settlement
of the account.

[4] See 11A Cal. Jur. 211.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 190; [2] Decedents' Estates, § 181; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 226; [4] Decedents'
Estates, § 230; [5] Decedents' Estates, § 165; [6] De,cedents' Estates,
§§ 3081 949; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 949.
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[5] Id.-Executors and Administrators-Collection of Assets-Obligations of Representative-Limitations.-Under Prob.' Code,
§ G02, a court may properly charge against the distrihutive
share of an e~ecutor as devisee or legatee the amount of his
notes to the deceased, together with interest, where they were
not barred when they became part of the assets in his hands.
[6] Id.-Family Support-Right as Statutory: Payment-Resort
to Assets-Family Allowance.-The right of a widow to recei. vc
a family allowance, pending the administration of an estute, is
purely statutory. Such an allowance granted pursuant t.o Prub.
Corle, § 680, is a charge against any available assets, whether
community or separate, where the testator made no provision
in his will thereior and designated no property froID which it
or any debt was to be paid. The phrase property "not disposed
of by the will," within Prob. Coae, § 750, doE'S llot include community property to which the widow succeeds solely by virtue
of her statutory one-half illterest, which by § 201 bolongs to
her a.s the surviving wife, nor the husband's COmmUll!ty h!l.lf of
property over which his tCfltamentary disposiHon fails by her
renunciation of his will, 311d to which she becomes entitled
under § 201 as a result of the absencc of an effective testamentary disposition.
[7] Id.-Payment of Debts - Resort to Assets for PaymentFamily Allowance - Construction of Prob. Code, § 202.-By
Prob. COele, § 202, providing that commun~*y property passing
from the control of the hushand by r(~ason of his death, etc., i::;
subject to his debts, etc., it was not intended that th~ community property shoul'" be alone ehargeable wit.h the pay:ne.,.tof
family allowances and expenses of administration. A contrary
conslruction mjght. result in chargh~g the obligation of an estate
to pay family allowance to a widow aga:nst her own community
intet'c8t in the property, a construction opposed to policy of
the law with respect to fanu1y allowances.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court o:f Glenn
County decreeing distributjon al1d from an order settling the
final account of an executor. R. M. Rankin, Judge. Affirmed.
Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Daniel S. Carlton, Oliv"er J. Carter and Pcrol Thorpe for Appellants.
George R. Freeman and Elmer Laine for Respondent.
[5] Seo lIB Cal. Jur. 554; 21 Am. Jur. 479.
[6] Sec llA Cal. Jur. 5G5, 513; 21 Am. Jur. 560.
[7] Treatmmlt of widow's allowance in case of death Qf ht:sbnnd
intestnte or her election to take against will, no~c 98 A. L. R. 1125.
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HOUSER, J.,-The cause herein was transferred to this
court after decision by the District Court of Appeal of the
Third Appellate District. Upon examination of the record, we
adopt as the decision of this court the opinion of the District
Court of Appeal, with such omissions and additions as may
hereinafter appear.
"Two sons of Frank J. King, deceased, have appealed from
the order settling the final account and directing distribution
of his estate. The appellants also seek to review a previous
order settling the first annual account of the executors, from
which no appeal was taken. . . .
"Frank J. King died testate, December 12, 1936, at San
Francisco, leaving surviving him,his widow, Josephine King,
two sons, Frank A.and William H. King, and a brother
named George W. King. He left a will ... by the terms of
which he appointed his widow and his son Frank as coexecutors. The will purported to dispose of his entire separate
property and of all the community property belonging to
himself and wife. He willed specific real and personal property
[which included farm lands and cattle] to each of his heirs. : ..
Letters testamentary were issued to Josephine King and
Frank A. King, February 16, 1937. The estate was appraised
at $49,142.33. The inventory included two unpaid notes
executed by Frank A. King and payable to his father, both
of which were matured. One note was for $4,328.10, upon
which unpaid interest was then due in the sum of $1,363.83.
That note was appraised at $5,691.93. The other note was
appraised. at $600.00. . . .
"The widow renounced her right to inherit property from
the estate of her husband according to the terms of his will,
and upon the contrary elected to take her share of the property pursuant to the rules of succession. The executors' first
annual account was settled and approved October 21, 1938.
In that account the widow was allowed $2,000 extra compensation, to be paid from. the assets of the estate. The order
making that allowance and settling the account was entered
October 21, 1938. No appeal was taken from that order
and it became final. Upon application therefor the court
also made an award of $100 per month to the widow for
a family allowance during the process of administration.
"The final account was settled and distribution of the property .of the estate was made and entered September 12. 1939.
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At that time the assets of the estate were marshaled and the
expenses of administration were properly apportioned against
the respective devisees, legatees and heirs in the proportions
ascertained from the appraised valuations of the distributive
shares received by each one. Besides the several ranches and
other personal property on hand for distribution, there was
$35,090.37 in cash, received from the sales of [several hundred] horses and cattle and from other sources. r~rhe costs
of administration were $12,277.53. rrhe portion of the costs
assessed against the widow was the sum of $5,295.09.
"All of the cash on hand, the two notes and the three
ranches which are involved on this appeal, are community
property. rrhose farms were caned respectively the 'Peterich
Ranch,' the 'Edgewood Ranch,' and the 'Magoffey Ranch'
[the community ownership in the last-mentioned ranch extending only to a two-thirds interest]. By the terms of the
will the Peterich Ranch was devised to the wjdow, together
with a legacy of $10,000, one-third of the proceeds from the
sales of horses and cattle, and whatever residue remained. after
the debts and expenses of administration had been Vaid. The
will ga ve to Prank A. King the Edgewood Ranch, the Magoffey Ranch, togeth~r with some other property, and a third
of 1he proceeds from the sales of cattle and horses.
"Having elected to inherit her share of the estate acco:xling
to the rules of succession, there was distrlbu ted to Josephine
King the Peterich Ranch, consisting of 314 acres of land, an
undivided one-half interest in the Edgewood Ranch, one-third
interest in the Magoffey Ranch, one-half interest in two small
notes and cash in the sum of $12,930.37, all of which properties· distributed to her were her community share thereof,
except that she took the entire Peterich Ranch undel' sectior..
201 of the Probate Code, as community property which was'
not disposed of by will on account of her renunciation of that
instrument.
"In the decree settling the final account and directing distribution to be made, the court charged Frank A. King with
the appraised value of the two matured notes as cash jn his
hands as a coexecutor, aggregating the sum of $6,854.46,
which he ower. to the estate. From that decree settling the
final account and directing distributinn of the estate to be
made,Frank A. King and his brother William have appealed."
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"It is contended the court erred in allowing the executrix
extra compensation for services in conducting a cattle business
during administratjon [without a previous order of court
therefor]; that the compensation was wrongfully charged
against both separate and community property of the estate;
that the expenses of administration were improperly apportioned; that the community interests of the deceased in certain real and personal property were illegally distributed to
the widow, and that Frank A. King was wrongfully charged
as a coexecutor with the appraised value as cash on hand, of
[the] two matured notes which he owed the deceased....
[1] "We are of the opinion the allowance of $2,000 as
extra compensation for carrying on the cattle business was
properly awarded. The will specifically authorized the executors to retain the cattle and horses for a period of 'about
one year from the date of the will,' and they were directed to
sell them when it was mr,st advantageous to do so. That provision necessarily infers that the business of carrying on the
cattle enterprise for a period of at least one year was authorized by the testator. The fact that the widow elected to inherit her share of the estate in accordance with the rules of
succession rather than under the provisions of the will, in
no way abrogated the independent authorization of the testator to carryon the business until the cattle could be sold to
advantage. That provision of the will is nevertheless valid
and binding. . . . The will was dated September 26, 1936.
On July 12, 1937, a portion of the cattle and horses was sold
... for $16,776.20. On October 8, 1937, before the year had
expired, the court made an order under section 572 of the
Probate Code, authorizing the executors to continue the stock
business. The following January the balance of the cattle
was sold . . . for $12,232.25. There is no evidence the stock
could have been sold to advantage before they were actually
disposed of. Evidently the business was conducted at a profit,
for the horses and cattle were appraised at $16,950. They
were sold for the total sum of $29,008.45.
[2] "It is the duty of an executor, with or without an
order of court,. to take charge of the property of an estate
and to preserve it in as good condition as is reasonably possible pending administration. (Estate of Fulmer, 203 Cal.
693 [265 Pac. 920,58 A. L. R. 430] ; Estate of Freud, 131 Cal.
667 [63 Pac. 1080, 82 Am. St. Rep. 407] ; Estate of Smtith,
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118 Cal. 462 [50 Pac. 701] ; lIB Cal. Jur. 250, sec. 842; 2
Bancroft's Prob. Pr., 682, sec. 359.) [See, also, Estate 0/
Meyer, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 409,412 (53 Pac. (2d) 984).] In
the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be presumed
the stock was properly cared ·for; that the expense of doing
so was necessarily incurred, and that the horses and cattle
were sold as promptly as was for the best interest of the estate.
The court so found. There is evidence to support the finding
that these duties were performed.
[3] "The court was authorized under section 902 of the
Probate Code, as it existed prior to the amendment of that
section in 1939, to allow additional compensation for the feeding and care of 565 head of horses and cattle belonging to
the estate. That section then provided in part: 'Such further allowances may be made as the court may deem just and
reasonable for any extraordinary services, such as . . . the
carrying on of the decedent's business pursuant to the order
of the court, and such other ... special services as may be
necessary for the executor or adm1:nistrator to ... perform.'
(Italics added.) It is said in Reidy v. Bidwell, 70 Cal. App.
552 [233 Pac. 995], at page 555, there is an exception to the
general rule that it is not ordinarily the duty of an executor
to carryon the business of the testator during the administration of his estate. That exception exists 'where the will of
the testator expressly creates the power so to do, or where
the carrying on of a business would be cast upon the executor
as a necessary means for the preservation of the estate.' "
(See, also, Estate of Maddalena, 42 Gal. App. (2d) 12 [108
Pac. (2d) 17] ; Estate of Broome, 162 Cal. 258 [122 Pac. 470] ;
Estate of 1Vard, 127 Cal. App. 347 [15 Pac. (2d) 901].) And
in lIB California Jurisprudence, at page 269, it is stated: "A
power to continue decedent's business may be conferred on
the executor by will, and the statute providing that the court
may authorize such continuance recognizes existing law and
merely adds another method of olltaining authority."
"\Vhere a continuation of the business of a deceased person during administration results in a profit to the estate, it
has frel}uently been said the executor is entitled to extra compensation therefor, even thongh he volur..tarHy assumes to
perform that service. (lIB Cal. Jur; 270, sec. 860; 2 Bancroft's Probe Pr., 788, sec. 419.) In the text last cited it is
said: 'Likewise, for management of farm o~'.erations, because
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of the chance of loss to the estate and personal liability on
the part of the representative, extra compensation may be allowed.' ...
"When extra compensation is allowable for such service,
the amount which it is proper to fix is within the sound discretion of the probate judge. (Estate of Broome, supra.) The
amount of extra compensation which has been awarded will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is improperly allowed
or clearly appears to be excessive. . . .
[4] "Moreover the appellants waived their right of appeal from the order allowing extra compensation, by their
failure to give notice of appeal therefrom within sixty days
from the time of the settlement of the account. . . . [Estate
of Meyer, 11 Oal. App. (2d) 409, 412 [53 Pac. (2<1) 984];
Estate of Grant, 131 Oal. 426 [63 Pac. 731] ; Estate of Fernandez,119 Oal. 579 [51 Pac. 851] ; Estate of Ward, 127 Oal.
App. 347, 351 [15 Pac. (2d) 901] ; Prob. Oode, sec. 1240; 11A
Oal. Jur., p. 211.] . . . [On] October 21, 1938, the probate
court made and enterel1 its order settling the . . . account.
That order specifically found that Josephine King performed
valuable services feeding and caring for the cattle; that her
special services were worth $2,000, and thereupon allowed
extraordinary compensation in that amount. . .. The notice
of appeal in this case is from the order settling the final
account and making distribution of the estate only, which was
made and entered September 12, 1939. . . .
[5] . "The court properly charged against the distributive
share of the estate received by the executor, Frank A. King,
[the] two unpaid matured promissory notes executert by him
to the deceased in his lifetime . . . [which] were included· in
the inventory as assets of the estate. The appellants contend
that these notes were· barred by the statute of limitations,
and that they were therefore erroneously charged to the distributive shaI'e of the maker of the notes.
"[On] September 5, 1930, for value received, Frank A.
King anl1 Graee V. King, executed and delivered to the deceased, Frank J. King, thejI' note for $1,200, payable five
years after the date thereof. It was never paid. It became
a paI't of the assets of the estate in the hands of Frank A.
King, one of the makers thereof, as a coexecutor of the will of
thcdec:eased. It was dn~ and was appraised at $600. It did
not cutlaw until FeLruary 6, 1939. Frank A. King qualified
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as executor February 16, 1937. The note was in his hands as
an executor of the estate for two years before it outlawed.
"On 1\ovflllber 25, 1932, for a valuable consideration,
Frank A. King executed and delivered to his father, another
note for $4,328.10, due one year after the date of execntion.
It was secured by a mortgage on real property. The note was
never paid. That note did not outlaw until November 26,
1937. It was also in the hands of the maker, as executor, for
about three months before it would outlaw.
"Section 602 of the Probate Oode charges an executor with
obligations which he owes to the testator' as so much money
in his hands.' It provides that such debts shall be included in
the inventory, and that the executor is liable therefor. . . .
"The notes executed by the executor which were due and
payable, and in his hands as assets of the estate before they
were outlawed, become chargeable to him as cash on hand,
and they were therefore properly charged, together with the
accumulated interest thereon, against his distributive share
of the estate. (Estate of Clary, 203 Cal. 335 [264 Pac. 242] ;
Estate of Miner, 46 Oal. 564; Estate of Jones, 115 Oal. App.
664 [2 Pac. (2d) 483]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Oal. 434 [33
Pac. 20] ; lIB Oal. Jur. 354, sec. 1100.) In ... Estate of
Clary, supra, it is said: ' ... as pointed out in 16 Oalifornia
Jurisprudence, page 420 et seq., sections 30 to 37, the rule is
that the statute of limitations does not run where the parties
occupy a fiduciary relationship toward each 'other, so long
as such relationship is not repudiated .... [I] rrespective of the
lapse of time which would ordinarily bar an action upon the
note, the executor, by reaSOn of his fiduciary capacity becoming chargeable with the note in his hands as so much money,
is ·in that capacity precluded from pleading the bar of the
statute, and, therefore, so long as the trust relatio'n continues,
.
the statute does not run.'
"It has been held that an executor, by virtue of his fiduciary relationship, is not only chargeable with the principal
sum of a note Which. he owes to the deceased, if· it is not outlawed before he accepts that trust, but he is also chargeable
with the interest due thereon, as cash in his hands. (Estate
of Miner, supraj lIB Oal. Jur. 556, sec. 1100.) In Estate of
M'iner, sup,"a, the court says with respect to the obligation of
the executor to pay both principal and interest of a note whit;h
he owes to the deceased : 'We think there was no error in
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charging the administrator with the amount of his own note
and the stipu1ated interest. It is a debt due to the estate
and has never been paid. The money has remained in h:s
hands, not separated or set apart from his private funds or
been devoted to the uses of the estate. Under what circumstances an administrator will become liable to pay interest is
discussed in Estate of Mary McQueen, 44 Cal. 584, and upon
the principles settled in that case we think the administrator
cannot escape the payment of interest.' "
[6] "The appellants contend that the court erroneously
directed payment of the family allowance, which was previously granted to the widow under section 680 of the Probate
Code, to be charged against the' devisees and legatees in the
proportions that they respectively share in the properties,
both community and separate,' upon final distrjlmtion. It
is asserted the entire amount of family allowance granted to
the widow is required to be paid from the community interests of the deceased and his widow. We think not. The right
of a widow to receive a family allowance, pending the administration of the estate, is purely statutory. (Ii ills v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 666 [279 Pac. 805, 65 A. L. R. 266] ; 11A
Cal. JUl'. 505, sec. 367; 21 A m. JUl'. 560, sec. 314; 24 C. J. 230,
sec. 758.) The will may direct that a specified sum of money
for family allowance shall be paid from particularl.y designated property. (Prob. Code, sec. 750.) The section last
mentioned provides that if the designated property' is insufficient' in value from which to pay the family allowance, the
obligation shall be made a charge against' that portion of the
estate not disposed of by the will.' It is further provided
that if such designated property is not sufficient for that purpose 'the property given to residuary legatees or devisees
shall be resorted to, and thereafter all other property devised
and bequeathed is liable for the same, in proportion to the
value or amount of the several devises and legacies, but the
specific devises and legacies are exempt from such liability
if it appears to the court necessary to carry into effect the
intention of the testator, and there is other sufficient estate.' "
It here should be noted that the testator made no reference
in his will to the payment either of a family allowance or of
any debt or expense of administration, nor did he designate
any property out of which such or any expense was to be paid.
However, it is the appellants' contention that the provisions
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of section 750 of the Pr.,bate Code were applicable here,that unner such application all of the community property
distrihnted to the widow was property "not disposed of by
the win," and therefore that such property should have been
first resorted to for the payment of the family allowance
and other expenses of administration.
To recapitulate, by her renunciation of the will, and according to the rules of succession, the widow succeeded to her
half of the entire community property, over which portion
the husband had no right of testamentary disposition. That
portion consisted of: an undivided one-half interest in the
Edgewood ranch; a one-third interest in the Magoffey ranch;
a one-half interest in the two small notes; and cash in the sum
of $12,930.37. In addition thereto, she succeeded to the entire community interest in the Peterich ranch. Her succession to that entire interest was based on her statutory one-half
community ownership· therein and, pursuant to the provisions
of section 201, Probate Code, on her right to succeed to the
other half as community property over which her deceased
husband's exercise of his right of testamentary disposition
became ineffective as a result of her renunciation of the will.
With respect to all the community property to which the
widow succeeded solely by virtue of her statutory one-half
interest, by operation of law, on the death of her husband
such property "belonged to" her asthe surviving wife (Prob.
Code, sec. 201). It therefore may not be successfully argued
that where, as here, the husband attempted to dispose of the
wife's community interest it thereafter became property" not
disposed of by the will," and that therefore it should have
been first resorted to for the payment of family allowance
and expenses of administration. Such property never belonged to the husband and the failure of his testamentary dis.
position thereof could not operate to place it in the category
of property "not disposed of by the will." (Estate of Hasel·
bud, 26 Cal. A.pp. (2d) 375 [79 Pac. (2d) 443]; Estate of
Marinos, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 8 [102 Pac. (2d) 443].)
But it is contended by the appellants that, ,in any event, the
community interest in the Peterich ranch over which the testator possessed the right of testamentary disposition, i. e., his
community half of such property, having failed as a devise
became property "not disposed of by the will." Under the
provisions of section 201, Probate Code, in the absence of a
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testamentary disposition by a deceased spouse of his one-half
of the community property, on his death such portion "goes
to'" the surviving spouse. rrhe husband is ~harged with
knowledge that if he makes a testamentary disposition of the
wife's half of the community property the law gives her the
right of renunciation of the will, with whatever attendant
benefits may flow therefrom. In the present case, one of the
effects of the widow's renunciation was to revoke and render
inoperative as a devise the decedent's testamentary disposition of his one-half of the Peterich ranck As another result
of her election to renounce the will the widow became entitled
to that one-half interest by virtue of the statutory right conferred on her by the provisions of section 201, to receive
such property in the absence of an effective testamentary disposition thereof by her deceased husband. The effect of her
renunciation of the will was to entitle her to the benefit of
the statutes of succ·ession "as fully and completely as if there
had been no will." (Estate of Bump, 152 Cal. 274 [92 Pac.
643] ; l1A Cal. Jur., pp. 513, 514.) It follows that as to the
widow such property cannot be regarded as property "no~
disposed of by the will" and therefore cannot be subjected
first to the payment of family allowance or any other expense
of administration.
Moreover, by section 751 of the Probate Code it is provided that legacies shall be paid, first, from property expressly appropriated therefor by the will and, secondly, from
, 'property not disposed of by the will." Therefore, were we
to accept appellants' contention that in any event the remaining one-half of the Peterich ranch-which because of
the widow's renunciation of the will became ineffective as a
devise-should be regarded as property "not disposed of by
the will," under the provisions of section 751 such property
could be taken from the wife and resorted to for the payment
of. legacies to other persons, a result which, obviously, the
legislature never intended should follow from its reference in
the several sections of the Probate Code to property "not disposed of by the will."
[7] The appellants also contend that under the provisions
of section 202 of the Probate Code it was intended that the
community property alone should be chargeable with the payment of family allowance and expenses of administration. We
do not so interpret the section.
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"In Estate of Finch, 173 Oal. 462 [160 Pac. 556], it is said
at page 464: ' ... the surviving TVife is ... given the right
to have a reasonable allowance made by the court for her
'support from the estate of her deceased husband, whether the
estate. was community property or his separate estate, and
irreppective of whether the widow has estate of her own out
of which she might support herself. '
I "Section 300 of the Probate CodespecificaJly provides that
, 'All of his [decedent's] property suaiJ be subject to the possession of the executor. or administrator and to the control
of the Superior Court for the purpose of administration ...
and shall be chargeable with the expenses of administering
his estate, and the payment of his debts and the allowance to
the family, except as otherwise provided in Ulis code.' "
Alldin the case of Esta.te of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. (2d)
375 [79 Pac. (2d) 443], under the provisions of section 70,
Probate ~ode, the will was revoked as to the surviving wife,
and it was contended that the expenses of family allowance
and other debts of administration should be paid entirely fro:n
community funds to which the widow had succeeded. It was
there held that section 750 was not applicable and that, pur:suant to the provisions of section 300, ,such expenses were to
be borne ratably by the community and separate property of
the decedent.
"A contrary construction of the statute might result in
charging the obligation of an estate to pay family allowance
to a wic.ow against her own community interest in the property. That construction is opposed to the policy of the law
with respect to family allowances. [See note in 98 A. L. R.,
at page 1326. j . . .
"'\Ve conclude that, under the circumstances of this case,
the court properly heJd that the family allowance [as well
as other expenses of administration] was chargeable to the
assets of the estate without regard to whether it consists of
community or separate property of the decedent."
The 8 ppellants' separate contention that the court wrongfully distributed to the widow any community property other
than that in which she possessed a statutory one-half interest,
has been fully discussed hereinbefore.
The decree settling the final account and ordering distribution o~ the estate is affirmed.
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Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
Carter, J., did not participate herein.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.- I dissent from that part of
the opinion upholding the charging of the debts, expenses of
administration, and the family allowance against the respective persons interested in the estate in the proportion that
each shared in the estate.
Probate Code section 201 provides: "Upon the death of
either husband or wife, one half of the community property
belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject to
the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the surviving spouse." Respondent,
testator's widow, after renouncing her right to take under
the will, succeeded to one-half of all the community property
as a matter of right under the above section. She was given
all of the Peterich Ranch, which was community property, on
the basis of the above section, because her husband, the testator, had failed to make an effective testamentary disposition
of his half.
The court charged the debts of the testator and the expenses of administration, including a family allowance to
the widow, against the respective persons interested in the
estate in the proportion that they shared in the estate. Probate Code section 750 provides: "If the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated,
for the payment of his debts, the expenses of administration,
or family allowance, they must be paid according to such provision out of the estate thus appropriated, so far as the same
is sufficient. If insufficient, that portion of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any, must be appropriated for that
purpose." (Italics added.) The testator did not designate in
his will any particular portion of the estate to be used for
the payment of his debts, administration expenses, and family
allowance. Therefore, under section 750, that portion of the
estate not disposed of by will should be resorted to for the
payment of these amounts before other portions of the estate
are assessed. Since one-half the community property automatically passes to the surviving wife upon the husband '8
death he has no power to dispose of it by will, and it therefore does not constitute a portion of his estate within the
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meaning of section 750. Although it is subject to his debts
and administration expenses by virtue of Probate Code section 202, it cannot be first resorted to under section 750.
(Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 375 [79 Pac. (2d)
443].) The testator, however, has the power to dispose of
the other half of the community property by will. If he
does not do so, it must be considered a portion of his estate
not disposed of by win within the meaning of section 750.
If he faHs to dispose of it by will, it passes to his wife under
section 201, but in this respect it does not differ materially
from separate property of which he makes no testamentary
disposition. When he does not dispose of some of his separate property by will, it passes to his wife, his wife and children, or to other heirs, according to the laws of intestate
succession. The latter half of section 201 simply fixes the
intestate succession to the deceased spouse's half of the community pro:perty. Thus, if a testator does not dispose of his
half of the community property by will it constitutes property not disposed of by win within the meaning of section 750
and must be resorted to first for the payment of debts and
administration expenses, if no property is svecifically appropriated for this purpose, just as if it were separate property
undispos~d of by will.
Estate of IIaselbu,d, supra, is distinguishable from the present situati;"'n. In that case the deced~nt married after he
made his will. His widow was therefore a pretermitted heir;
under Probate Coc1e section 70 the will was revoked as to her
and she was entitled to her intestate share of the estate. Since
section 750 has no application to the estates of persons dying
completely intestate, the court, in order to insure the wife's
receiving the share of the estate that she would receive if the
husband died completely intestate, properly held that the
property which the wife took as her intestate share of the
estate, including all of the community property, should not
be resorted to first for the payment of debts and expenses
under section 750, but should be charged for the debts and
expenses on the same basis that it would be charged if the
husband died completely intestate. In the present case, however, the respondent's renunciation of her right to take under
the will does not entitle her to an intestate share of the
estate, but merely gives her the right to take her half of the
community property free from the testamentary disposition
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made of it by ·the testator. She takes the other half of the
Peterich Ranch, not on the-)theory that her husband died intestate but because after her renunciation it remained undisposed of by will.
In the present case, therefore, one-half of the Peterich
Ranch constitutes property undisposed of by the will of the
testator and, under section 750, should be resorted to for the
payment of debts, administration expenses, and the family
allowance, before other portions of the estate are charged.
Gibson, C. J" concurred.
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MARIE A. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. C. L. BEST, Respondent.
[1] Waters-Procedure-Evidence-Ownership.-In an action to

enjoin the pollution of a stream, a finding against the ownership of a water right appurtenant to a ranch was not supported by evidence where the uncontradicted evidence showed
that, through successive conveyances over a period of 50
years, the right was finally conveyed to the plaintiff by a deed
to her as appurtenant to the ranch, where it also showed an
uninterrupted beneficial use of the water by the successive
owners of the ranch, and where, though the extent of the
right as originally secured was not shown, some of the deeds
and the testimony of a witness described the capacity of the
flume and ditch.
[2] ld.-Procedure-Pleading-Appropriation.-The ultimate fact
of ownership of a water right is sufficiently averred where
[2] See 26 Cal. Jur. 519.
McK. Dig: References: [1] Waters, § 726; [2] Waters, § 705;
[3] Waters, § 285 (3); [4] Waters, §§281; 285; [5] Evidence,
§ 261; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1237; [7] Waters, § 318; Sales, § 9;
[8] Waters, § 342; [9, 14] Waters, § 318; [10] Easements, § 2;
[11] Waters, §§ 29, 318; [12] Easements, § 59; [13] Easements,
§§ 7, 59; [15, 16, 18] Waters, § 284; [17, 19] Injunctions, § 36.
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the complaint alleges that the plaintiff and her predecessors
in interest have owned a right in the waters of a creek,
acquired in a designated year by diversion and continuous use
upon the ranch of the plaintiff for irrigation and domestic
purposes.
[3] ld.-Interference of Third .Parties-Pollution-Evidence.A finding that the waters of' a creek were not polluted or
rendered unfit for domestic, household and agricultural purposes was not supported where the evidence showed the dumping in the stream of quantities of sand, clay, gravel and mill
tailings, and where there was testimony as to the discoloration of the water, its unfitness for drinking and irrigation
purposes, its clogging of pipelines and ditches, and the wearing out of power machinery.
[4] ld.-Interference of Third Parties-Pollution-As Between
Appropriators-Remedies.-An appropriator of waters of a
stream, as against upper owners with inferior rights of user,
is entitled to have the water at his point of diversion preserved in its natural state of purity; and any use which corrupts the water so as essentially to impair its usefulness for
the purposes to which he originally devoted it, is an invasion
of his rights. Any material deterioration of the quality of
the water by subsequent appropriators or others without
superior rights entitles him to both injunctive and legal relief ..
[5] Evidence-Hearsay-Exceptions-Declarations of Deceased
Persons.-Declarations of a deceased predecessor in title of
a party, made in relation to the property before he parted
with his interest therein, such as declarations as to h!s receipt
of a sum in settlement of a dispute as to the pollution of the
water, constitute admissible hearsay evidence and are binding
upon his successors in title either as declarations against
pecuniary interest or as in the nature of vicarious admissions.
Such evidence, although not entirely satisfactory, will support
a finding, particularly in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1849, 1853.)

[6] Appeal- Review - Questions of Law and Fact - Review of
Credibility.-Obje.ctions to testimony on the ground of its
remoteness or inconsistencies therein relate not to the admissi~
bility and suffi.ciency, but to the weight and credibility, mat~
ters not considered by the appellate. court.
[7] Waters - Contracts - Validity and Construction - Polluting
Water: Sales-Subject Matter-Quality.-An agreement between a mining company and the owner of a water right
[4J See 26 Cal. Jur. 188.

